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P ROFESSOR Lucian Bebchuk argues that U.S. public corpora-
tions should adopt a default rule requiring elections every two
years in which shareholders have access to the corporate ballot and
the power to replace all directors and in which candidates who re-
ceive a significant number of votes are reimbursed for the expense
of launching a corporate election campaign. His proposal raises the
intriguing question of whether shareholder interests would be bet-
ter served under this proposal than under the admittedly anemic
system of shareholder democracy that currently characterizes U.S.
corporate governance.
There is nothing wrong with Bebchuk's policy proposal. Indeed,
since it is framed as a default rule that firms would be free to con-
tract around, the proposal seems wholly unremarkable, bordering
on uninteresting. Despite the tepid nature of the proposal, it con-
tains several analytical flaws that, while not necessarily fatal, de-
prive it of much of its appeal. In other words, when stripped of rhe-
torical flourishes, there is good news and bad news for
shareholders in Bebchuk's proposal. The bad news is that it ap-
pears to offer little, if anything, that will promote his broad objec-
tive of advancing shareholder welfare. The good news is that the
proposal is sufficiently modest that it is unlikely to do much dam-
age.
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law,
Yale University. I am grateful for conversations with Ian Ayres, John Donohue, Yair
Listokin, and Alan Schwartz, for the comments and edits of Katie Burke, Norah
Cooney, Christine Hyojin Kim, and Jim Zucker, and to the editors of the Virginia
Law Review for giving me the opportunity to respond this time (see Jonathan R.
Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the States in Regu-
lating Takeovers?, 57 Bus. Law. 1025 (2002)).
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Due to constraints of time and space, I will focus on what I view
to be the three basic but fundamental analytical flaws in the essay's
reasoning. These are (a) shortcomings in empirical methodology;
(b) failure to recognize the vast difference between the issues in-
volved in removing directors and the issues involved in replacing
directors; and (c) failure to understand the true source of legiti-
macy for U.S. corporate directors. This Response will discuss each
of these flaws in turn.
I. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
"The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise" is based on a particu-
lar, succinct empirical claim, namely that shareholder voting power
is a myth and that the reality is that shareholders lack the power to
replace directors. Bebchuk supports his claim by analyzing the re-
sults of an "empirical examination of the frequency and outcome
of" contested corporate elections.2 Bebchuk looks at the ten-year
period between 1996 and 2005 and finds that there were 303 con-
tested elections, some of which did and some of which did not in-
volve director contests in which rival slates of directors sought to
manage the company that was the target of the contested election.'
Thus, in Table 2, the key table in the essay, Bebchuk identifies
118 contested elections for directors in which there were election
contests "focusing" on an alternative team for governing the com-
pany.4 In attempting to interpret these empirical findings, Bebchuk
asserts out of the blue that "[w]e have seen that the incidence of
electoral challenges by a rival team seeking to run the company
better is quite small-and successful such challenges are quite
rare." The problem is that Bebchuk offers no statistical theory but
rather only his own strong intuition to support the implicit exis-
tence of the baseline necessary to permit him to conclude that there
are too few, rather than too many, or just enough electoral chal-
lenges in corporate elections.
'Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675,
711 (2007).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 682-686 & tbl.2.
Id. at 686 tbl.2.
'Id. at 688.
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The lack of any baseline for his empirical claim is extremely
problematic. He has no explanation for why he thinks 118 con-
tested elections is too few. Still more troubling is the lack of any
suggestion whatsoever in the essay that Bebchuk reached the nor-
mative conclusion that the number of contested elections was too
low before he obtained his results rather than in response to them.
His argument would be more plausible if he had estimated a base-
line prior to starting his analysis.
In fact, it is quite plausible that the number of contested elec-
tions is sufficient. Observing the same landscape as Bebchuk, a
prestigious business group,' a prominent law firm,7 and a task force
of the American Bar Association8 all reached the opposite conclu-
sion. They found not only that "shareholders do run election con-
tests on a regular basis," but also that "under the existing [proxy]
rules, running an election contest.., is already a viable alternative
and a viable threat."9 Significantly, there is no empirical dispute be-
tween Bebchuk and these other groups: they do not disagree about
what the numbers are, only about what the numbers mean. In
Bebchuk's personal, subjective opinion, the number of contested
director elections is too low. Although he does not go so far as to
suggest how many contested elections would be sufficient, he obvi-
ously thinks the number should be higher, although how much
higher is anybody's guess.
Of course, Bebchuk is entitled to his opinion regarding how
many contested director elections there should be. It is not objec-
tionable that Bebchuk holds or defends such a view. The problem
is his inference that he has legitimate support in empirical or social
science for his opinion. What Bebchuk does is simple: he counts
the number of contested elections for directors and asserts that this
number is too small. This opinion may be as titillating as, but is en-
titled to no more deference than, the opinion expressed by Em-
Statement of Stephen A. Odland, Chairman, Corporate Governance Task Force,
Bus. Roundtable, to the SEC (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.businessroundtable.org/
newsroom/document.aspx?qs=56A6BF807822BOF13D3419167F75A70478154.
'Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (June 11,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/wachte1061103.htm.
'Letter from the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA's Section of Bus. Law to
the SEC (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/
aba010704.htm.
' Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 7.
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peror Joseph II and others in the eighteenth century that Mozart's
Abduction from the Seraglio had "too many notes."'"
Bebchuk finds further support for his baseline claim that there is
not enough competition in elections for corporate directors by
finding that smaller corporations tend to be the target of electoral
challenges more often than larger corporations." Of course, given
that there are far more small companies than large companies, it is
hardly surprising that we observe more contested elections among
smaller companies. In other words, the reliability of his results is
undermined by his failure to control for firm size. Moreover, even
if it were true that small firms are more likely to experience con-
tested elections than large firms, this disparity might fully be ex-
plained by other factors, such as the existence of alternative disci-
plinary forces for managers of larger companies that are less costly
and more effective than elections.
Bebchuk suggests some other reasons to support his view that
there are too few contested director elections. First, he asserts that
in light of the "hundreds of firms that restated earnings in recent
years, and the large number of companies whose boards elect not
to follow majority-passed shareholder resolutions, one would ex-
pect to see more challenges by rival teams."'2 With regard to the
incidence of restatements, Bebchuk's analysis is incomplete be-
cause it fails to consider the obvious fact that the market has a
plethora of other ways to discipline weak management that are
likely to be both cheaper and more efficient than contested elec-
tions for directors. Such elections are expensive and do not lead di-
rectly to the desired result: replacement of the management team
responsible for the erroneous or fraudulent earnings reports. Spe-
cifically, research by Professors Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins found
that sixty percent of a sample of public firms that restated earnings
in 1997 and 1998 experienced a turnover of at least one senior
manager (defined as the chairman, CEO, or president) within
twenty-four months of the restatement, compared to only thirty-
five percent of comparable firms. Moreover, this research shows
"A. Peter Brown, Amadeus and Mozart: Setting the Record Straight, 61 Am.
Scholar 49, 53 (1992).
"Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 686-87 & tbl.3.
12 Id. at 688.
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that eighty-five percent of these displaced managers were unable to
secure comparable employment with rival firms later."
Similarly, Professor Srinivasan examined the turnover of outside
directors who restate their earnings and found that directors of
firms that experience financial reporting failures are more likely to
lose their jobs. He also reports that outside directors in general,
and especially outside directors who are members of the audit
committee of the board of a company that is forced to restate its
earnings, are not only more likely to leave the board of that com-
pany, but also to lose directorships at other companies."
Along these lines, it is worth observing that any shareholder who
accumulates more than fifty percent of the shares in a corporation
can ultimately obtain control of the board of directors, including
complete control, provided that the company does not have cumu-
lative voting. Bebchuk and others argue convincingly in previous
work that staggered boards of directors can delay changes in con-
trol.'" But staggered boards are a matter of shareholder choice, and
the incidence of staggered boards has been on the decline, indicat-
ing that shareholders' preferences are reflected in corporate pol-
icy.'
16
Even more problematic is Bebchuk's suggestion that directors
should be replaced in the "large number of companies whose
boards elect not to follow majority-passed shareholder resolu-
tions."'7 It is not at all clear why directors should be replaced for
" Hemang Desai et at., The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting:
Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover 3 (Aug. 17, 2004) (unpub-
lished paper, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association), available at
http://www.fma.org/NewOrleans/Papers/1401148.pdf.
Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Direc-
tors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members, 43 J.
Acct. Res. 291, 293-94 (2005).
" Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin.
Econ. 409, 409 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force
of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2002).
" Incidentally, Bebchuk's empirical scholarship on staggered boards does not reflect
the baseline bias problem that characterizes his current work on shareholder elections
because he is able to look at the incidence of various things (like takeovers) that hap-
pen to companies with staggered boards and see how that compares with what hap-
pens at companies that do not have staggered boards. In other words, in his previous
work on staggered boards, unlike here, there is a control group that provides a base-
line. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 926 tbl.2.
," Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 688.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 93 Va. L. Rev. 763 2007
Virginia Law Review
failing to implement a single-issue resolution. Shareholders may
well approve of thousands of decisions made by managers and
therefore be unwilling to remove directors who decline to imple-
ment a single proposal, despite its approval by a majority. More-
over, the very existence of a large set of companies whose boards
elect not to follow majority-passed shareholder resolutions is itself
evidence for the vitality of shareholder democracy because it indi-
cates that, at least on occasion, a majority of shareholders are both
paying attention to the issues and willing to register their views on
those issues. The mere fact that a majority of shareholders occa-
sionally disagrees with directors on particular, discrete issues, how-
ever, does not necessarily imply that the shareholders actually want
to oust the directors entirely. Just as in ordinary politics, reason-
able voters may choose to reelect their representatives even if they
disagree with those representatives about certain individual issues.
Bebchuk also asserts that there should be "substantial share-
holder dissatisfaction in a significant number of the companies that
belong, say, to the set of firms performing in the bottom ten per-
cent of their peers."18 Bebchuk may well be correct in this observa-
tion. However, he fails to provide any insight as to why such dissat-
isfaction should manifest itself in efforts to remove directors by
contested elections, as opposed to other means, such as hostile
takeover, failure of the nominating committee to renominate in-
cumbent directors, or pressure from key investors leading to "vol-
untary" resignation.
With regard to establishing a meaningful baseline, there are sev-
eral questions worth asking. One question that immediately comes
to mind is whether dishonest or incompetent managers already are
being replaced through market mechanisms that are cheaper and
faster than corporate elections. It is far from clear that it matters
how poor performers are replaced: whether by internal governance
mechanisms; pressure from private equity investors, venture capi-
talists, or other institutions; hostile takeover; or the mere threat of
a contested election (whether or not such a threat ever material-
izes).
Another question that comes to mind is whether the worst-
performing directors are more likely to be replaced than the worst-
[Vol. 93:759
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performing incumbents in Congress. During the period between
1990 and 2000, House incumbents were reelected at an average
rate of 94.1%.'" And, unlike the data that Bebchuk reports, the re-
election trend in congressional elections has been increasing.2 This
trend is particularly interesting given the political context in which
rival political parties actually generate rivals for incumbents. In
corporate elections there is no similar institutional mechanism for
automatically generating opposition candidates. Presumably, these
statistics would lead Bebchuk to the conclusion that the U.S.
House of Representatives lacks legitimacy due to the lack of evi-
dence that elections to Congress are contested.
II. REMOVAL VERSUS REPLACEMENT
Another significant disappointment is Bebchuk's failure to rec-
ognize the vast difference between the issues involved in removing
directors and the issues involved in replacing directors. Removing
directors presents few analytical problems, as long as there are
enough remaining directors to constitute a quorum. In particular,
removing directors avoids the very difficult problem of identifying
and recruiting replacement directors. Perhaps Bebchuk is right that
directors should be removed more often than they are and that fix-
ing the problem would not be difficult. A default rule requiring
majority voting and the use of "withhold" votes, as was done in the
Disney election in March 2004, should do the trick.2
"9 Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress: 2001-2002, at 69 tbls.2-7
(2002).
2 Reelection rates for the U.S. House of Representatives between 1992 and
2004 were as follows: 1992, 88%; 1994, 90%; 1996, 94%; 1998, 98%; 2000, 98%;
2002, 96%; 2004, 98%. See The Big Picture: Reelection Rates Over the Years,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.asp?cycle-2004 (last visited Mar.
3, 2007); American Politics: Congress Reelection Rates, 1966-2004,
http://www.laits.utexas.edu/gov310/VCE/conreelection/index.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
21 Corporate voting rules require that public corporations give shareholders three
alternatives: to vote for all of the board's nominees for directors, to withhold support
for all such candidates, or to withhold support from certain specified nominees. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2006). In March 2004, Michael Eisner was stripped of his
post as chairman of Disney Corporation when forty-three percent of Disney share-
holders withheld their votes from the embattled Disney chair, resulting in a decision
by the Disney board to split the posts of board chair and CEO. See Michael
McCarthy, Disney Strips Chairmanship from Eisner, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2004, at B1.
2007] 765
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Bebchuk does not fully account for two problems with replacing
rather than merely removing incumbent board members. First, he
provides no explanation for how outside challengers to incumbent
boards are to be identified and recruited. Second, even if such di-
rectors can be identified and recruited, Bebchuk provides no guid-
ance on the crucial question of how outside challengers for board
positions will be able to send a credible signal that they will be able
to outperform the incumbent directors.
As for the recruitment problem, it is not easy to find able, ex-
perienced, and competent people who are eager to become direc-
tors of public companies. In the political framework, democracies
have a highly developed system in which two or more political par-
ties recruit, screen, and legitimize potential nominees for political
office. There is no analogous process for corporate elections, and it
is not obvious how one could be created. Unlike rival politicians,
rival board candidates compete along vectors such as competence,
experience, and integrity, rather than along vectors such as ideol-
ogy, interest-group identification, and loyalty. As such, it is far
from clear what sort of signaling function might be played by rival
parties who nominate candidates in corporate elections.
The role of corporate director is both more time consuming and
riskier than ever before. Presumably Bebchuk would not change
this trend. Nor would he wish for directors to be held less account-
able either to regulators or shareholders than they are now. But in
the current environment, a significant number, perhaps as many as
half of all prospects, decline offers to serve on boards, even when
such offers are made by the companies, not by insurgents.22
Bebchuk appears to assume away the acute problems of identify-
ing, recruiting, and performing due diligence for potential chal-
lengers to incumbent directors.
Second, even to the extent that we are able to locate challengers
for board incumbents, it is far from clear how to make such chal-
lengers credible candidates for office. As Bebchuk acknowledges,
corporate elections are plagued by a variety of collective action
and signaling problems. People launching proxy contests for con-
22 See Key Considerations for Serving on a Board of Directors, Advantage (RSM
McGladrey, Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 2006, 4, http://advantage.hanleywood.com/
default.aspx?page=article236.
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trol are unable to capture all of the gains that might be realized by
shareholders in the event of a change in control because such gains
inevitably will be shared among all of the equity claimants. Poten-
tial rivals for board seats will not fully internalize the potential
benefits from launching such a contest.23 To the extent that chal-
lengers bear the full costs of launching a proxy contest but do not
reap the full rewards, some worthwhile challenges will not be
launched. Moreover, challengers in proxy contests have a difficult
time signaling credibly to shareholders that they are seeking to dis-
place the incumbent directors because they are better managers,
rather than for more nefarious reasons.
Bebchuk generally recognizes the existence of these sorts of
problems when he writes that:
[S]hareholders cannot infer from a rival team's mounting a chal-
lenge that the rival directors would perform better. To begin,
even a rival team that believes it would perform better may be
acting out of hubris. Furthermore, and very important, a rival's
decision to mount a challenge does not even imply that the rival
itself believes it would perform better. After all, a challenge
could be motivated instead by a desire to obtain the private
benefits associated with control.24
Bebchuk is absolutely correct in this analysis of signaling prob-
lems facing challengers to incumbents in corporate elections. My
problem here is not with Bebchuk's analysis, but with his failure to
see its implications. First, the signaling and free-rider problems
identified here go a long way towards explaining any perceived
"deficiency" in the incidence of challenges to board incumbents.
Challengers do not fully internalize the benefits of corporate con-
trol and thus cannot credibly signal their motivations for seeking
such control. If challengers cannot persuade voters that they are
not crooks out to loot the target company, it is extremely unlikely
that they will be able to persuade voters that they will be able to
run the company better than the incumbents.
Second, Bebchuk suggests that the free-rider problem can be
addressed by making it easier for challengers to obtain reimburse-
23 See Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 689-90.
24 Id. at 692.
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ment for the costs associated with mounting a proxy contest." The
problem with this proposed solution is that it fails to recognize
that, whatever the other merits of reimbursing rivals who attract
significant support, such reimbursement will exacerbate, not miti-
gate, the credibility problems facing challengers. Rational share-
holders will understand that if Bebchuk's reimbursement proposal
is implemented, challengers will internalize an even smaller share
of the costs of mounting a proxy contest for control, but will inter-
nalize the same benefits. This, in turn, will provide less-qualified,
lower-probability candidates with greater incentives to run, par-
ticularly since those candidates with the lowest opportunity costs to
their time and effort will benefit most by the prospect of reim-
bursement for their election expenses.
III. SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS
According to Bebchuk, shareholders' lack of meaningful democ-
ratic voice, particularly in replacing boards of directors, is a prob-
lem because it deprives directors of "legitimacy."26 This is a deep
and fascinating claim, and one wishes that Bebchuk had developed
it, at least a little.
Presumably, Bebchuk would acknowledge the reality that corpo-
rate directors of public companies in the United States are elected
pursuant to established, legitimate state and federal law rules gov-
erning the election process. Bebchuk does not, in other words, sug-
gest that the process by which directors are elected does not con-
form to applicable state or federal statutes or common law rules.
Thus, Bebchuk's implicit assertion is that the process by which di-
rectors are elected is illegitimate despite the fact that it is the very
process provided for by state and federal lawmakers.
Perhaps Bebchuk is saying that the elaborate, long-standing,
carefully considered statutes pursuant to which corporate directors
are elected in the United States are themselves illegitimate. At a
minimum, he is making the profound claim that acting pursuant to
these statutes is not sufficient to confer legitimacy on corporate di-
Id. at 693 (suggesting that free-rider problems make it "worthwhile to consider...
providing reimbursement of costs to rivals who attract significant support but fall
short of winning").26 Id. at 676.
[Vol. 93:759768
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rectors. This assertion raises the question of what election proce-
dures would be sufficient to convey legitimacy in his view. As with
the absence of a baseline empirical measure specifying how many
contested elections is "enough," Bebchuk fails to provide any de-
scription of what is necessary to convey the legitimacy that he
complains is lacking in elections for corporate directors in the
United States.
Similarly disappointing is the lack of discussion of whether
Bebchuk thinks that everything done by U.S. directors is illegiti-
mate, or whether he thinks that some of what they do is legitimate,
while other activities are not because of the absence of a legitimate
election process. For example, are the managers of U.S. corpora-
tions also illegitimate in Bebchuk's view, because they were ap-
pointed to their positions by directors who are not legitimate?
It appears plausible that capital market performance, rather than
election results, confers legitimacy on directors. The legitimacy of
corporate managers and directors like Jack Welch and Warren
Buffett is derived not from their ability to garner votes at election
time from shareholders. Rather, their legitimacy comes from their
ability to deliver strong returns to investors, after they have been
elected in a manner consistent with applicable law. Thus, being
elected in a manner consistent with the minimum legal require-
ments would seem to be a necessary condition for legitimacy of
corporate directors, with competence and integrity also being re-
quired.
Thus, the development of institutions that prove their effective-
ness over time and fulfill the necessary legal prerequisites is both
necessary and sufficient to establish the legitimacy of an institution
like the corporate board of directors. In contrast, under Bebchuk's
reasoning about legitimacy, federal judges would lack legitimacy
because they enjoy life tenure, are never elected, and cannot be
removed from office by voters. In fact, federal judges in general,
and Supreme Court Justices in particular, have a great deal of le-
gitimacy, yet voters have far less power to replace members of the
Supreme Court than shareholders have to replace directors. The
prestige and legitimacy of the judiciary in general, and individual
judges in particular, depend on judges' ability to reason effectively
and to present powerful and effective arguments for their opinions.
As with judges, there is no reason to think that directors' legiti-
2007] 769
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macy comes from the fact of their election rather than from the
quality of their performance while in office.27
Further support for this point can be found by looking at the le-
gitimacy of currencies like the dollar, the euro, and the yen. Com-
plex factors, including economic strength, underlying political sta-
bility, and the perceived independence of the monetary authority
contribute to the strength and legitimacy of a particular currency.
But there is no evidence or argument supporting the proposition
that the legitimacy of an institution like a currency-or a board of
directors--depends on whether the underlying currency is subject
to democratic constraints. Indeed, the opposite appears to be true:
the more independent monetary policy is from democratic institu-
tions, the more stable the underlying currency is likely to be.'
Finally, in addition to performance measures of the kind just de-
scribed, the legitimacy of directors and other important figures in
society derives from attaining their positions of power and author-
ity through legitimate means. Thus, for example, when Ben S. Ber-
nanke became Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, like his predecessor Alan Greenspan, his initial
legitimacy came not from his record of success in effectuating
monetary policy, but from the fact that he was properly nominated
and confirmed in a process generally conceded to confer democ-
ratic legitimacy on nominees.
" Of course, it is undeniable that a benevolent dictator who stages a violent coup
d'6tat but thereafter abides by the rule of law and promotes equality and prosperity is,
nevertheless, an illegitimate ruler. No matter how skillfully a person performs her
self-appointed role, the issue of whether she obtained her office via legitimate means,
both substantively and procedurally, is always relevant. However, Bebchuk cannot
seriously claim that U.S. directors cannot make legitimate claims on their offices be-
cause of the insufficiencies that he asserts plague the electoral system. The ineluctable
reality is that shareholders support directors in elections that are, as a positive matter,
entirely legal and therefore legitimate from the perspective most closely associated
with H.L.A. Hart, which is that "law and morality are best kept separate; that rules
are the heart and soul of the legal process." Allan C. Hutchinson, A Postmodern's
Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 788, 788 (1995). In other words, be-
cause there is an appropriate legal infrastructure that establishes procedures for elect-
ing directors, and those procedures generally are followed, the necessary conditions
for the legal validity of the election of U.S. directors clearly have been met. Thus,
while Bebchuk is free to contest the desirability of the current process for electing di-
rectors, his claims about legitimacy are unconvincing.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independ-
ence, 27 J. Legal Stud. 433, 434 (1998).
770 [Vol. 93:759
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Interestingly, throughout much of U.S. history, and even in 1913
when the Federal Reserve Act was passed, the idea of a central
bank was highly controversial. It was not clear to many whether
Congress had the constitutional authority to create a central bank.
And initially, as with the move to a single European currency, it
was not clear to many whether centralized monetary policy was
advisable. 9 The legitimacy of the U.S. central bank does not lie in
the Constitution, or even in the democratic foundations of the in-
stitution, but rather in the strong historical record of performance
and integrity generated over time by the institution. The same is
true for boards of directors. In other words, Bebchuk's claim that
directors are illegitimate because they are not popularly elected by
shareholders and because elections are not transparent or con-
tested goes too far because the same claims can be made with even
more force against a host of other institutions, including central
banks, cardinals of the Catholic Church, and Supreme Court Jus-
tices.
CONCLUSION
Under U.S. law in all fifty states, shareholders have the power to
elect directors and to govern the director nomination process. If
desired, shareholders could cause a corporation's organizational
documents to align with the voting arrangements that Bebchuk ad-
vocates. However, the default rule is not what Bebchuk would like
it to be. Under extant state law, there is no statutory shareholder
right of subsidized access to a corporation's ballot box of the kind
Bebchuk advocates.
Bebchuk argues that the absence of such a right results in too
few challenged corporate elections, although he presents no theory
or evidence to support this assertion. He presents no method or
tool with which to gauge what the optimal number of contested
elections would be. Apparently, from Bebchuk's point of view, the
more elections the better, regardless of the additional cost. The ab-
sence of a baseline for analysis makes it impossible to analyze this
claim.
2 See Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Money Matters: The American Experience
with Money, http://www.chicagofed.org/consumer-information/moneymatters.cfm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007).
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Bebchuk recognizes that rational shareholders have compelling
reasons to doubt the motives of outsiders who mount contests to
remove incumbent directors. Subsidizing losing contestants will not
solve this problem, and would probably make it worse. Moreover,
the inability of shareholders to distinguish candidates who will use
their control to increase firm value from candidates who will di-
minish firm value through ineptitude or looting may provide a
complete explanation for why we observe so few contested elec-
tions.
Bebchuk also argues that flaws in the process of electing direc-
tors mean that the election process does not give directors the le-
gitimacy it should. But the legitimacy of corporate directors comes,
in the first instance, from the fact that state law confers upon direc-
tors both the power and the obligation to manage the business and
the affairs of the corporation.' Beyond that, legitimacy comes from
demonstrating integrity and competence over extended periods of
time. A glance at the prestige of national currencies, central banks,
and elected and nonelected judges raises serious questions about
Bebchuk's assertion that a link exists between legitimacy and the
extent to which incumbents are effectively contested by rivals in
elections.
Finally, a purely practical note is in order. As Bebchuk correctly
observes, the market for corporate control in the United States is
hampered by legal rules that make it too easy for boards of direc-
tors to enact antitakeover defenses. Such antitakeover defenses ex-
ist despite sound economic arguments in favor of robust corporate
control. They exist because of the triumph of special interest poli-
tics in both state legislatures and judiciaries.3" In light of the tri-
umph of special interest groups in regulating takeovers, and the
lack of any realistic prospects for deregulatory reform of that mar-
ket, one must ask whether there is any reason to believe that an in-
creased number of director elections will improve accountability in
the way Bebchuk speculates that it will.
0See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (2005).
"' See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1
Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 10, 24-36 (2006).
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